

11

The Final Seanad Election?

*John Coakley*¹

The run-up to the election of the 24th Seanad saw a spiral of attacks on the second chamber, and promises that the 2011 election to that body would be the last. The volume of criticism had grown as parties questioned the need to retain the Seanad, even in reformed shape. In October 2009 Fine Gael leader Enda Kenny proposed outright abolition of the house, and this commitment was incorporated in his party's election manifesto. At the beginning of January 2011, as the general election loomed, Fianna Fáil sources indicated that they would trump this, proposing to hold a referendum on the same day as the general election with a view to abolishing the second chamber.² The party manifesto duly included a commitment to abolition as part of a broader reform package. The manifesto of the Labour Party was unambiguous, announcing that 'Labour will abolish the Seanad'. Not surprisingly, the formal programme for government of the new Fine Gael–Labour coalition incorporated a promise to abolish this body.

This seeming unanimity between the largest three parties in the Dáil might appear to have sealed the fate of Ireland's apparently unloved second chamber. If political commitments are taken at face value, this chapter in the 2011 version of *How Ireland Voted* will be the last on a Seanad election. But the history of the debate on Seanad reform shows that, as in many other areas, enthusiasm for reform can wilt quickly in the wake of an election; it is precisely this debate that we consider in the section that follows. The remaining sections of this chapter consider three aspects of the election of the largest component of the Seanad, the 43 'panel' members (the nomination process, the electoral process and

the political outcome), before looking at the election of the six university senators and the appointment of the Taoiseach's 11 nominees.

The Seanad and its critics

The Irish Seanad continues to be something of an anomaly among its peers. By 2011, most parliaments of sovereign states (111 out of 188) were unicameral; the Irish Oireachtas was one of 77 bicameral parliaments (41 per cent of the total). But its composition made it particularly unusual. In most second chambers the predominant principle of representation is territorial: members are intended to represent populations or territories, whether they are elected directly (as in the USA) or indirectly (as in France, where local councillors have the major say). A further considerable group of second chambers is made up mainly of members nominated by the head of state; and some others are mixed in composition.³ In only two cases is a second chamber designed to represent functional or vocational interests: Ireland and Slovenia (a third case, the Bavarian Senate, was abolished in 1999, but this was, in any case, a subnational body). The Slovene National Council seeks to give expression to corporate groups: its 40 members comprise 22 representatives of local interests, four of employers, four of employees, four of farmers, crafts, trades and independent professions, and six of non-commercial fields (universities, other education, research, culture and sport, health care, and social welfare). It has also been relatively successful in achieving this form of representation, by ensuring that electoral interests registered in these categories have a decisive voice in determining who is elected.⁴

At first sight, provisions for the election of the Irish senate appear similar (and similarly unusual, in reflecting corporatist thinking of the early twentieth century). As provided for in Article 18.7 of the 1937 constitution, the Seanad has three components. The largest group consists of 43 senators elected from five panels that represent sets of 'interests and services' into which, by implication, Irish society is divided:

1. National language and culture, literature, art, education and such professional interests as may be defined by law for the purpose of this panel;
2. Agriculture and allied interests, and fisheries;
3. Labour, whether organised or unorganised;
4. Industry and commerce, including banking, finance, accountancy, engineering and architecture;

5. Public administration and social services, including voluntary social activities.

A further six senators are elected by graduates of the country's oldest two universities, the National University of Ireland and the University of Dublin (Trinity College). The remaining 11 senators are appointed by the Taoiseach.⁵

One of the strongest criticisms levelled at the Seanad is that it has altogether failed to fulfil the representative function set out for it in 1937 – that it has never really reflected the kinds of interests outlined in the constitution. This chapter will provide yet more evidence – not that it is needed – of the validity of this allegation. Of course, more fundamental criticisms have also been made: that vocational representation is not desirable in any case, and that a second chamber is an unnecessary luxury – if not an entirely inappropriate constitutional device – in the modern democratic state (or, at least, in a unitary state).

Aside from the calls for outright abolition that have been referred to above, one of the commonly cited complaints about the Seanad in the run-up to the 2011 election was that it had been the subject of a long series of reports on which no action had been taken. Specifically, 12 reports (the most recent in 2004) were mentioned, implying an extraordinary tendency to talk about rather than to implement reform. Whatever the faults of the Seanad, though, this criticism is unfair. This number (12 reports whose conclusions had apparently been ignored) seems to have arisen from a misinterpretation of the 2004 report, which simply listed 11 reports that had been compiled earlier. However, one third of these reports dealt with very general topics, such as the composition and powers of the original senate of the Irish Free State (1928), options for a new senate (1936), vocational organisation as a general principle of social organisation (1943), and the overall content of the constitution (1967).⁶ Another third was made up of reports into aspects of the election of the 43 panel members, including technical or mechanical issues (in 1937, 1947, 1952 and 1959).⁷

This leaves four more recent reports. The Constitution Review Group (1996) concluded that 'the Seanad does not appear to satisfy the criteria for a relevant, effective and representative second house', but took the view that there was insufficient time to consider so complex an issue in detail.⁸ But the three remaining reports addressed the position of the Seanad in some detail and called for far-reaching reform. The Oireachtas committee that considered the review group's report turned on two occasions to the Seanad. In its second report (1997), it made radical proposals for an

overhaul of its make-up, and, following a change in the composition of the committee, it returned to the issue in its seventh report (2002) with a rather different blueprint. The Seanad's own Committee on Procedure and Privileges appointed a sub-committee to consider the issue of reform following the 2002 election, and proposed yet another schema (2004).⁹

These three reports acknowledged the impossibility of giving effect to any meaningful form of vocational representation, and each proposed a complex, hybrid alternative:

- A 60-member body with 15 senators elected from European constituencies in the same manner as MEPs, 14 elected by Dáil deputies, 14 by local councillors, six by university graduates, and 11 Taoiseach's nominees (1997 report).¹⁰
- A 60-member body with 48 members elected from a single state-wide constituency by means of a list system, and 12 Taoiseach's nominees (2002 report).¹¹
- A 64-member body with 26 members elected from a single state-wide constituency by means of a list system on the same day as the European and local elections, six elected by university graduates on the same day, 20 elected by an electoral college made up of newly-elected Dáil deputies, outgoing senators and county and city councillors, and 12 Taoiseach's nominees (2004 report).¹²

There is little evidence that implementation of any of these recommendations was given serious consideration; most recently, an All-Party Group on Seanad Reform in 2008–10 sought to find common ground between parties, but little followed from its deliberations.¹³ The transition from proposals for reform to calls for abolition was abrupt, and did not appear to be based on any of the research or deliberation that had informed the reports on reform just discussed. The abolitionist position had been foreshadowed in the 1980s by the Progressive Democrats, who initially called for dropping the Seanad from the constitution but changed their stance following their own experience of the operation of the second chamber.¹⁴ This hostile view of the Seanad received new life in the wake of the economic crisis that began in 2008, for which the Seanad, as such, did not have any specific responsibility, and in respect of which its abolition is likely to have virtually no impact. Commitments to do away with the Seanad, however, did little to impede the enthusiasm with which political parties prepared to contest the April 2011 election to that body, the issue to which we now turn.

The schedule for the election was determined by the date of the dissolution of the Dáil, 1 February 2011 (the Seanad election must take place within 90 days of this). Nominations of university candidates closed on 3 March, those from nominating bodies on 11 March, and those from Oireachtas members on 21 March. The panels of candidates were completed on 25 March and published on 29 March, and ballot papers for these and for the two university constituencies were distributed by registered post, with the requirement in each case that they be sent back to the returning officers by the voting deadline of 26 April for the panel elections and the following day for the university elections. The counting of votes began immediately and concluded four days later. The composition of the Seanad was completed when the Taoiseach announced his 11 nominees on 20 May, exactly three weeks after the completion of the other senate counts.

The panel nominations

Nomination of candidates in Seanad elections is more restrictively controlled than in Dáil elections, where any citizen nominated by a registered political party, by 30 people from the Dáil constituency in question, or who pays a deposit of €500, may stand as a candidate. There are two routes. First, a Seanad candidate may be nominated to one or other of the five panels by a nominating body (typically, a public organisation) associated with that panel and registered as entitled to do this. The register is maintained by the Clerk of the Seanad and is updated annually.¹⁵ Second, any four Dáil deputies or senators (or combination of the two) may also nominate a candidate (but each may make only one nomination). Candidates in each panel are grouped into two sub-panels depending on the way in which they have been nominated, and the electoral law requires the election of a minimum number of senators from each sub-panel.

The manner in which this process was conducted in 2011 is summarised in Table 11.1. In three panels with large numbers of nominating bodies each body was entitled to a single nomination, though not all exercised this right. On the Cultural and Educational panel, for instance, 19 bodies made no nomination at all, and another 13 nominated 12 candidates between them (this is because one candidate was nominated by two bodies – an improbable combination of the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland and the Drama League of Ireland). The nomination of the remaining body evaporated when the candidate later opted for a different panel to which she had also been nominated. On the Industrial and

Commercial panel, 11 bodies made no nomination, and the remaining 32 nominated 26 candidates between them (some candidates secured several nominations). On the Administrative panel, three bodies made no nomination, and the remaining 12 nominated ten candidates in all.

Table 11.1 Seanad candidate nominations by panel and sub-panel, 2011

Panel	Nominating bodies sub-panel		Oireachtas sub-panel	Total candidates	Total senators to be elected	
	No. of bodies	No. of candidates	No. of candidates		Min. per sub-panel	Total
Culture and Education	33	12	5	17	2	5
Agriculture	11	18	10	28	4	11
Labour	2	12	9	21	4	11
Industry and Commerce	43	26	9	35	3	9
Administration	15	10	9	19	3	7
Total	104	78	42	120	–	43

Sources: Calculated from *Iris Oifigiúil* 23, 22 March 2011, and *Iris Oifigiúil Supplement* 25B, 29 March 2011.

On the two remaining panels, where the number of nominating bodies was smaller in relation to the number of senators to be elected, the bodies were entitled to put forward more candidates. On the Agricultural Panel, the 11 bodies were each entitled to two nominations. It is interesting to note that eight of these maintained a form of political balance by nominating one Fianna Fáil and one Fine Gael candidate each (the ninth nominated two Independent candidates, and two bodies made no nominations). On the Labour Panel, with 11 senators to be elected but only two nominating bodies, each was entitled to seven nominations, and each body availed of this. The Irish Congress of Trade Unions nominated two candidates from each of the largest three parties, and an Independent; the Irish Conference of Professional and Service Associations deferred less to political balance, with five Fianna Fáil and two Fine Gael nominees (because of overlapping nominations, this resulted in 12 candidates in all).

The ease with which candidates could appeal to different types of organisation – and even to organisations on different panels – illustrates the weak connection between candidacies in the Seanad election and the vocational principle. One prominent outgoing Fianna Fáil senator, leaving nothing to chance and mopping up potential sources of nomination of rival candidates, secured nominations from four bodies

on the Industrial and Commercial panel (Wholesale Produce Ireland, the Chambers of Commerce of Ireland, the Insurance Institute of Ireland, and the Institute of Bankers in Ireland). A Fine Gael county councillor secured a nomination on two panels, Culture and Education (from the Library Association of Ireland) and Administration (from the National Association for Deaf People), but she later opted for the latter. Overall, the overwhelmingly party political character of the nomination process was clear: of the 78 nominating body candidates, 66 were associated with the largest three parties, and five of the remaining 12 candidates were politically active (either in local councils or as candidates in the earlier Dáil election).

The partisan character of the nomination process was even more obvious in the case of the Oireachtas nominees where, as well as candidates from the largest three parties, three Sinn Féin candidates, two Independents and a solitary Green Party candidate were nominated. Of particular interest here was the effort by Fianna Fáil leader Micheál Martin to reinvigorate his party by appealing for priority support for a list of 10 candidates (though four of these were put forward on the nominating bodies sub-panels). This was of particular importance in circumstances where no fewer than 35 Fianna Fáil TDs had been defeated in the general election, and might well have considered careers as senators (though it did not really represent an innovation: there had been a similar 'inner list' in 2002 and 2007, but this was not publicised at the time). Many of this group, however, like those outgoing Fianna Fáil deputies who retired from public life at the Dáil election, seem to have regarded the political trauma associated with the economic collapse as spelling the end of their political careers (only 13 of them contested the Seanad election). Nevertheless, in addition to the party leader's list there were four further nominations of Fianna Fáil candidates by Oireachtas members, as well as 17 from nominating bodies. Alongside the ten Fianna Fáil Oireachtas nominees, Fine Gael parliamentarians nominated 20 candidates and Labour a further six.

By contrast with the proactive approach of the leader of Fianna Fáil, a consequence, no doubt, of the shock the party suffered in the Dáil election, the process of candidate selection in the other parties appeared more open – at least at the level of the initial proposing of candidates. However, the party leadership played a critical role in filtering candidacies. Fine Gael had a five-member selection committee and Sinn Féin used its Ard Chomhairle (executive) to select candidates likely not just to win seats but also to advance the party's longer term strategic interests (such as providing representation in areas where it currently has no

Dáil representation, and offering parliamentary experience to potential future Dáil candidates). The selection process in the Labour Party was more open, and therefore harder for the party leadership to manage, with the decisive vote being made at a large selection meeting including the parliamentary party as well as executive representatives.

The political nature of the contest is reflected in the electoral profile of the 120 candidates. All but 19 had well-established political careers: nine had been Dáil deputies (two of them, indeed, junior ministers) until suffering defeat in the general election, 24 were members of the outgoing Seanad and 68 were, or had recently been, local councillors (of whom 63 were members of the Seanad electorate). No fewer than 47 had stood unsuccessfully in the Dáil election. Truly 'vocational' candidates were hard to find. Most of those who did not have an established political profile were aspirant party politicians; a clear exception was the President of the Royal Institute of Architects of Ireland, nominated by his own organisation – a rare example of the kind of candidate that the vocational panels were originally intended to attract.

The panel electorate

The partisan character of the panel elections is further underscored by the nature of the electorate. This consists of all county and city councillors, newly-elected Dáil deputies and outgoing senators – overwhelmingly associated with political parties, and in any case politically involved. The distribution of the electorate in 2011 is presented in Table 11.2. This shows a considerable change from earlier Seanad elections, with a decline in the position of Fianna Fáil as its most pronounced feature. The 2009 local elections had not been kind to the party: as economic conditions plummeted, it lost the position of dominance it had maintained since the local elections of 1934, trailing far behind Fine Gael for the first time ever. The gap between the two parties widened further in the 2011 general election (see Chapter 7), with Fine Gael now returning almost four times the number of TDs of its historical rival. Only among senators – the smallest component of the electorate – was Fianna Fáil able to hold its own. The previous Seanad panel election in 2007, together with the Taoiseach's nominees, had given that party a relatively strong position in the second chamber, but this was insufficient to compensate for setbacks elsewhere.

The dramatic character of the change in the Seanad electorate is illustrated in figure 11.1, which presents its composition in selected years since 1977. This suggests that the decline in Fianna Fáil's fortunes

predates 2011. If we consider 2002 as representing the traditional voting relationship between the three main parties, the big changes that are clear since then are a drop in Fianna Fáil support from 45 per cent to 24 per cent, and corresponding increases in support for Fine Gael (30 per cent to 39 per cent), Labour (9 per cent to 16 per cent) and others (16 per cent to 21 per cent). One important point of qualification about this pattern needs to be noted. As popular hostility towards Fianna Fáil began to manifest itself in the last years of the decade, many long-standing party figures at local level began to distance themselves from the party, and even to contest the local elections of 2009 as Independents. The 'Other' category in Table 11.2 and in Figure 11.1 thus probably includes a number of local councillors who, though formally 'non-party', are in reality close to Fianna Fáil and potentially open to mobilisation by that party at Seanad elections.

Table 11.2 Composition of Seanad electorate, 2011

<i>Component</i>	<i>Fianna Fáil</i>	<i>Fine Gael</i>	<i>Labour Party</i>	<i>Sinn Féin</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Independent/non-party</i>	<i>Total</i>
Local councillors	213	340	131	51	17	129	881
Dáil deputies	20	76	37	14	5	14	166
Senators	27	6	2	0	3	7	45
Total	260	422	170	65	25	150	1,092

Note: 'Others' include People Before Profit, Socialist Party, Green Party, Workers' Party, Republican Sinn Féin, South Kerry Independent Alliance, and former Progressive Democrat.

Sources: Calculated from *Iris Oifigiúil Supplement 25A*, 29 March 2011, *Members of County Councils, City Councils and Borough Councils 2010/2011* (Dublin: Department of the Environment, 2010), information supplied by the political parties, and other sources.

Yet another factor that needs to be borne in mind is a degree of horse-trading between parties, and special deals brokered by individual candidates. Reference has already been made to Fianna Fáil's strategy, and this was matched in different ways on the part of the other parties. Since the political composition of the electorate is known, it was easy for each party to compute the number of electoral quotas available to it on each panel, and to determine where unaffiliated votes might, if available, be most efficiently used. As in 2007, Sinn Féin was able to arrive at understandings with candidates of other parties in the two panels where it was not standing, with Fianna Fáil's Labhrás Ó Murchú (Culture and Education) and Mark Daly (Administration) as potential beneficiaries, but with the Labour Party also appearing to benefit on the latter panel.




Figure 11.1 Distribution of Seanad panel electorate, 1977–2011

Note: data points refer to share of electorate.

Sources: Derived from Table 11.2, and from John Coakley, ‘The Irish Senate election of 1977: voting in a small electorate’, *Parliamentary Affairs* 33:3 (1980), pp. 322–31; John Coakley, ‘The Senate elections’, pp. 195–205 in Howard R. Penniman and Brian Farrell (eds), *Ireland at the Polls 1981, 1982, and 1987: A study of four general elections* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, for the American Enterprise Institute, 1987); John Coakley, ‘The Senate election’, pp. 148–61 in Michael Gallagher and Richard Sinnott (eds), *How Ireland Voted 1989* (Galway: Centre for the Study of Irish Elections, 1990); John Coakley, ‘The Senate elections’, pp. 135–45 in Michael Gallagher and Michael Laver (eds), *How Ireland Voted 1992* (Dublin: Folens; Limerick: PSAI Press, 1993); John Coakley and Maurice Manning, ‘The Senate elections’, pp. 195–214 in Michael Marsh and Paul Mitchell (eds), *How Ireland Voted 1997* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999); Michael Gallagher and Liam Weeks, ‘The subterranean election of the Seanad’, pp. 197–213 in Michael Gallagher, Michael Marsh and Paul Mitchell (eds), *How Ireland Voted 2002* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Theresa Reidy, ‘The Seanad election’, pp. 187–204 in Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh (eds), *How Ireland Voted 2007: The Full Story of Ireland’s General Election* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

While deals between parties mattered, and the support of party headquarters was important for individual candidates, one of the most notorious features of Seanad elections is the hard slog that each candidate must undertake to engage with the electorate. The election campaign is largely invisible: candidates criss-cross the country, trying to make personal contact with individual councillors to secure their support, but are never sure how successful their efforts have been (see the contribution by one Seanad candidate, Averil Power, in Chapter 6,

where she describes the campaign as ‘the “Discover Ireland” route to the Seanad’). New social and other electronic media may help to bridge some communication gaps, but cannot replace long-standing comradeship and local and partisan loyalties. The role played by the party leadership no doubt helps some candidates more than others, but is calculated primarily to maximise the party vote. Each party circulates a list of its candidates (usually in the form of a mock ballot paper) to party voters; in 2011, Fine Gael prepared an elaborate and detailed booklet for the guidance of its supporters. Party organisations also make every effort to ensure that everyone turns out to vote – whether by bringing voters together in Dublin, as in the case of Sinn Féin, or doing so at county level, as in the case of Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil.

The panel results

As already indicated, the fact that the composition of the electorate is well known is often seen as making the results of the panel elections a foregone conclusion. The electoral system resembles that in the Dáil elections, the single transferable vote.¹⁶ The electoral quota in 2011 ranged from 17 per cent (about 177 votes) on the five-member panel to 8 per cent (about 89 votes) on the 11-member ones. On the basis of their known share of electoral quotas, Fine Gael seemed certain of 17 seats, Fianna Fáil of 11 and Labour of seven. But it was overwhelmingly probable that Sinn Féin would win a seat on each of the two 11-member panels, and quite likely that it would win a further seat on the nine-seat panel and have a good chance on the seven-member panel. Of the remaining four seats, Fine Gael seemed poised to win two, with one each to Fianna Fáil and Labour. If we altogether ignore voters not affiliated to these four parties, then, and make no assumptions about transfers or deals between parties, straightforward arithmetic would suggest that Fine Gael would win 19 seats, Fianna Fáil 12, Labour eight and Sinn Féin four. In the event, as Table 11.3 shows, Fine Gael won one seat fewer than this (18) as did Sinn Féin (not surprisingly, since it ran only three candidates), but Fianna Fáil performed remarkably well in the circumstances, with 14 seats.

Some of the factors behind this outcome have already been referred to. On the smallest two panels, Sinn Féin did not have a candidate of its own, but its members appear to have concentrated their support on a particular Fianna Fáil candidate in each case – and these two candidates were indeed elected, no doubt incurring a certain moral debt to Sinn Féin. The Labour Party also seems to have profited on the Administrative panel. In addition, the large number of unaffiliated electors included a

sizeable group of former Fianna Fáil members who had left the party in disillusion with its economic policies or in a tactical response to its growing unpopularity, but who might be reluctant to support candidates of other parties against their former colleagues. Observers also suggested that competition within Fianna Fáil was enhanced by the endorsement of only ten of the party's 31 candidates by the party leader, and that this gave an added vigour to the Fianna Fáil campaign.

Table 11.3 Results of Seanad panel elections by party, 2011

<i>Panel</i>	<i>Fianna Fáil</i>	<i>Fine Gael</i>	<i>Labour Party</i>	<i>Sinn Féin</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
Culture and Education (candidates–seats)	385 (4–2)	479 (11–2)	157 (1–1)	0 (0–0)	44 (1–0)	1,065 (17–5)
Agriculture (candidates–seats)	329 (10–4)	445 (13–4)	166 (2–2)	82 (1–1)	44 (2–0)	1,066 (28–11)
Labour (candidates–seats)	320 (7–3)	445 (8–5)	166 (3–2)	84 (1–1)	51 (2–0)	1,066 (21–11)
Industry and Commerce (candidates–seats)	305 (6–3)	459 (18–4)	186 (5–1)	73 (1–1)	44 (5–0)	1,067 (35–9)
Administration (candidates–seats)	348 (4–2)	434 (9–3)	233 (4–2)	0 (0–0)	49 (2–0)	1,064 (19–7)
Electorate (total candidates–seats)	260 (31–14)	422 (59–18)	170 (15–8)	65 (3–3)	175 (12–0)	1,092 (120–43)

Note: 'Others' include one Green Party candidate (Industrial and Commercial panel, 19 votes). Sources: Computed from data made available by the Office of the Clerk, Seanad Éireann, www.seanadcount.ie, and information provided by the political parties.

Analysis of the outcome shows a remarkable uniformity across panels on the part of Fine Gael, though it also suggests that the party had limited success in winning support from the 175 electors not affiliated to the four main parties: assuming support from all of its own electors, it seems to have won the support of between 12 and 57 of the unaffiliated electors. Fianna Fáil, by contrast, seems to have won the support of about 45 of these 'others' on the Industrial and Commercial panel, increasing well above this on all other panels, and exceeding its 'core' vote by 125 on the Cultural and Educational panel (more than half of these additional votes were likely to have been Sinn Féin ones). Labour support, however, fell below its 'core' vote on three panels, but exceeded it on the other two – by a large margin of 63 votes on the Administrative panel (perhaps with the addition of Sinn Féin support). Sinn Féin focused its attention on the largest three panels, where the quota was lowest, winning a handful of

first preference votes above its 'core' support and gaining sufficient lower preferences to secure the election of all three of its candidates – though the transferred votes came mainly from Independent and Labour candidates.

The tension between the two categories of Fianna Fáil candidates was particularly interesting. Most votes were cast for candidates not on the party leader's list, but that is not surprising, since there were 21 of these in all (in fact, this group won on average 52 votes each, compared to an average of 60 for the ten on the leader's list). The outcome was that nine of the 14 Fianna Fáil senators elected had not been endorsed by the leader, an outcome that suggested that this strategy had had limited success, and was used by many long-standing but 'excluded' senators to gain sympathy and mobilise support.

As it happens, Fianna Fáil was in the running for an additional seat, but lost this as a consequence of a peculiarity of the electoral rules. As we have seen, there is a requirement that a minimum number of seats be allocated to each sub-panel within each of the five panels. For many years, there was a tendency for candidates on the Oireachtas sub-panels to perform better than those on Nominating Body ones (this perspective is symbolised in the description of the former as 'inside' and the latter as 'outside' candidates). It is true that, other things being equal, candidates nominated by Oireachtas members tend to perform better than candidates of nominating bodies. Furthermore, in the past this often caused special rules to be invoked to ensure minimum representation of nominating body candidates. More recently, the same rules have had to be used to ensure minimum representation of Oireachtas nominees, but 2011 was different. By the 15th count on the Administrative panel, three Fine Gael, two Fianna Fáil and one Labour candidate had been elected. Since four of these were on the Oireachtas sub-panel and two on the Nominating Bodies one, no further Oireachtas nominee could be elected. There were at this stage two continuing candidates who had not reached the quota; and the seat had to be allocated to Labour's Denis Landy (nominated by the Association of Municipal Authorities of Ireland), even though he was nine votes behind Mary Fitzpatrick of Fianna Fáil (one of Micheál Martin's Oireachtas nominees), who was thus a casualty of this little-known but important counting rule.

Once again, then, the results of the panel elections illustrated the highly partisan nature of the process. It is true that there were some high-profile political casualties, including the two Fianna Fáil former ministers of state (Seán Connick, who was supported by party leader Micheál Martin, and Martin Mansergh) and the outgoing Leader of the Seanad, Senator Donie Cassidy. But Independent candidates fared very

poorly. The most authentic representative of the vocational sector, the President of the Royal Institute of Architects of Ireland, received only one vote, and was placed between two other Independents who won respectively two votes and none.

At first sight, there appeared to be evidence that 'inside' candidates (nominated by Oireachtas members) had an advantage over 'outside' ones: they won on average 56 votes, as opposed to an average of 38 for 'outside' candidates. But crude comparison of this kind is hazardous, not least because of different levels of competitiveness across panels. It indeed seems likely that the profile of the candidates matters independently of this: those with little political profile are less likely to win 'inside' nominations, and, quite apart from this, they are less likely to win votes. If we exclude them and consider only the 64 candidates with the most established political profiles, the gap between the two nomination pathways diminishes: 'inside' candidates won on average 62 votes, 'outside' candidates 52.¹⁷

If we look at the question of regional support patterns, it is striking that the distribution of candidates tended to follow closely the distribution of the electorate. But if we compare the final outcome with the distribution of the population, the under-representation of the east becomes obvious. The province of Leinster, including Dublin, accounted for 54 per cent of the population, for 46 per cent of the Seanad electorate, and for 44 per cent of the candidates. But, surprisingly, these candidates won only 35 per cent of the first preference votes, and accounted for only 26 per cent of panel senators elected.

The university seats

In many respects, the provision for the election of six senators by university graduates has drawn even more fire than the character of the panel elections. Giving votes uniquely to university graduates has been criticised as elitist; but giving them to graduates of only two of the state's universities has been faulted as unjustifiably selective. In an era when university representation in parliament was common, the University of Dublin (Trinity College) had returned representatives to the old Irish House of Commons, and after the Act of Union of 1800 these instead attended the UK House of Commons at Westminster. In 1918 the National University of Ireland (NUI) was given similar rights, and both university constituencies continued to be represented in the Dáil after 1922. Although university representation in the Dáil came to an end following a constitutional amendment in 1936, the constitution

of the following year allocated three members in the new Seanad to each of the two universities (together with five other members elected in the panel election, these were seen as part of the Cultural and Educational component).

With the expansion of third-level education, it became increasingly difficult to justify the exclusive nature of this representation. By 2009, for example, the NUI accounted for only 32 per cent of all those graduating from undergraduate courses, Trinity College for just 6 per cent, other university-level institutions for 14 per cent and the institutes of technology for 48 per cent.¹⁸ Already in 1979, the constitution was amended by referendum (with a huge majority of 92 per cent voting in favour) to allow this anomaly to be rectified. The amendment allowed university representation to be regulated by ordinary legislation; but no such legislation was ever introduced.

As a result, then, only graduates of the oldest two universities are entitled to vote, with each university returning three senators. The electorate in each case was extremely large in 2011: just under 98,000 in the NUI, and almost 54,000 in the University of Dublin constituency. Given the debate on the allegedly unrepresentative nature of university representation, it is worth looking in greater detail at its composition; this is reported in Table 11.4. Quite significant differences will be noticed between the two universities, and these were much greater in the past. The NUI electorate broadly reflects the distribution of the Irish population, though with a stronger Dublin bias (this accounts for 31 per cent of the electorate, as compared to 28 per cent of the overall population). In the earlier years, the Dublin share was rather higher. The proportion resident outside the state, 3 per cent, has been shrinking over time. The University of Dublin, perhaps not surprisingly, lives up to its name in having a much stronger Dublin orientation (47 per cent of the electorate). A much higher proportion are resident outside Ireland than in the case of the NUI (16 per cent) and in the past this would have been higher still. Of those receiving their degrees before 1960, for example, 66 per cent are now resident outside the Republic, though they are required to be Irish citizens if they wish to be part of the Seanad electorate. This no doubt reflects Trinity College's long but now less marked tradition of recruiting students from Northern Ireland and Britain.

It is likely that getting qualified graduates to register for Seanad elections poses a considerable challenge, especially in the NUI, where the electorate has not kept pace with the growing pool of graduates. This no doubt reflects the university's own diverse structure, with large campuses located around the country, but also its uncertain future (given

proposals to abolish it) and the debate about the appropriateness of such representation at all. Even among registered graduates, turnout in the election tends to be low – 36 per cent in the NUI and 29 per cent in the University of Dublin in 2011. Yet, the election was intensely contested, with 27 candidates in the NUI constituency and 19 in the University of Dublin one (though, in fact, 20 names appeared on the ballot paper – after the close of nominations it emerged that one candidate was ineligible as she was not an Irish citizen).¹⁹ Strangely, candidates are not themselves required to be graduates, though they must be nominated by ten graduates of the university whose representation they are contesting.

Table 11.4 Distribution of Seanad university electorate by period of first qualification and region, 2011

<i>Period of first qualification</i>	<i>Dublin (%)</i>	<i>Rest of Rep. of Ireland (%)</i>	<i>Northern Ireland (%)</i>	<i>Great Britain (%)</i>	<i>Rest of world (%)</i>	<i>Total (number)</i>
<i>National University of Ireland</i>						
Before 1960	41.0	52.6	2.3	2.5	1.7	6,261
1960–69	36.9	57.7	1.5	1.6	2.2	9,944
1970–79	32.4	64.2	0.9	1.1	1.4	19,813
1980–89	28.6	68.1	0.7	1.3	1.4	24,552
1990–99	28.5	69.1	0.5	1.0	0.9	22,146
2000–09	29.3	69.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	14,535
Total	31.1	65.7	0.8	1.2	1.3	97,251
<i>University of Dublin</i>						
Before 1960	21.7	12.6	23.0	27.8	14.9	1,983
1960–69	31.0	21.0	16.4	19.2	12.4	1,664
1970–79	44.2	24.2	8.8	11.4	11.4	3,839
1980–89	48.0	30.9	2.7	9.3	9.1	11,024
1990–99	49.4	39.6	2.0	4.3	4.7	17,447
2000–09	49.3	44.3	2.8	1.7	1.9	17,633
Total	47.1	36.7	4.1	6.3	5.8	53,590

Note: The data exclude two electors in the NUI constituency whose qualifications were awarded after 2009 and 481 whose deaths were recorded only after publication of the register, and 75 electors in the University of Dublin constituency where information in respect of region or year of qualification was missing. The full electorates in the respective constituencies were 97,734 and 53,665.

Sources: Computed from anonymised registers supplied by the Registrar, National University of Ireland, and the Vice Provost, Trinity College Dublin (University of Dublin).

On the NUI side, two of the outgoing Independent senators, Rónán Mullen and Fergal Quinn, stood for election again and were comfortably returned. They were joined by another Independent, John Crown, a well-known medical consultant and critic of the health system, who

fought off a challenge from several other strong candidates. Those with a distinctive party political background fared poorly, as former Progressive Democrat, Green and Sinn Féin candidates failed to gain momentum – perhaps because, unlike the established candidates, whose campaigns began well before the election was called, their decision to stand was typically a last-minute one. In the University of Dublin constituency, two well-known incumbents were re-elected (David Norris, Independent, who was also looking for support for what proved in the end to be an unsuccessful bid to contest the presidential election, and Ivana Bacik, who had stood as a Labour candidate in the general election). The third seat was won by TCD economist Seán Barrett against a strong challenge from a former Progressive Democrat, Tony Williams, who was backed by the third outgoing senator, Shane Ross, who had himself been elected to the Dáil (see p. 152 above). Canvassing for votes in the university constituencies was particularly challenging, with candidates resorting to mail-shots to all potential voters and circulating publicity leaflets.²⁰ Some candidates organised public meetings or even engaged in door-to-door canvassing in areas where there was a reasonably high concentration of electors.

The Taoiseach's nominees

The composition of the Seanad was rounded off by the announcement of the Taoiseach's 11 nominees, which contained some surprises. As part of the arrangement that put the Fine Gael–Labour coalition in office, the filling of these positions had been divided between the two party leaders. Taoiseach Enda Kenny (who formally nominated all 11) put forward seven nominees. Only one of these was a full-time politician (a Louth county councillor); two more were known to be associated with Fine Gael, though they had built their reputations outside the area of politics, and did not take the Fine Gael whip; and four were Independent, having come to public prominence by other routes. By contrast, three of the four nominees put forward by Tánaiste Éamon Gilmore were active politically – they had contested the Seanad panel elections as Labour candidates, and two of them had also stood in the earlier Dáil election. In an unusual development, eight of the Taoiseach's nominees agreed to form a separate Independent group in the Seanad, leaving just one taking the Fine Gael whip and two taking the Labour whip.

If the emphasis on party affiliation was weaker in 2011 than in earlier Taoiseach's appointments, that on gender was stronger. A majority of those nominated were women – three from the Taoiseach's own list and all four of the Tánaiste's. This was in part a response to long-standing

criticisms of male dominance in the Seanad (and in the Oireachtas more generally). But it was no doubt further encouraged by the negative reaction to the appointment of a strongly male-dominated government just a few weeks earlier. The inclusion among the Tánaiste's nominees of a prominent campaigner for equal rights, Katherine Zappone, offered a further at least symbolic marker of the extent of this change.

A further noteworthy feature of the 11 nominees was the absence of any representative of Northern Ireland's political interests. Such representation had been a feature of Taoiseach's nominations over the period from 1982 to 2002, and the three major parliamentary documents that had considered the composition of the Seanad had all recommended that this practice be formalised.²¹ Bertie Ahern had not, however, included any Northern Ireland resident among his nominees in 2007, and Enda Kenny followed suit in 2011. The appointment of the President's husband, Martin McAleese, was no doubt intended as a gesture in this direction, though it was politically sensitive in circumstances where his term as a senator would overlap with the last six months of his wife's term of office as President. Originally from Belfast, Dr McAleese's working life was divided between the Republic and Northern Ireland before he moved to Dublin in 1997 when the President took up office. Though best known publicly as the President's consort, he had been playing a particularly active role behind the scenes, notably in liaising with loyalist groups in Belfast.

A summary of the composition of the new Seanad is given in Table 11.5. While Fine Gael emerged as the largest party with 19 seats, it is noteworthy that its leader, like previous Taoisigh, did not 'go for broke' in seeking to maximise the representation of his own party through his right of nomination. Together with Labour's 11 seats, the government formally controls half of the second chamber. This is likely to provide stability for as long as the coalition lasts – especially since several of the Independent senators are politically close to the government, and any vacancies occurring among the 'panel' senators will be filled by vote of current Dáil and Seanad members, not by the original electorate. Fianna Fáil, with only 14 seats, is at its lowest point ever in this chamber as in the lower house, and here, too, its role in opposition is likely to be challenged by Sinn Féin, even though that party has only three seats. The strength of the unaffiliated component (13 senators) is worth noting. In an adjustment to the tradition of overwhelming male dominance, the proportion of women senators has risen to an historic peak of 30 per cent – still lower than in many other parliaments, but well above the current level in the Dáil (15 per cent).

Table 11.5 Overall result of Seanad election, 2011

<i>Group</i>	<i>Fianna Fáil</i>	<i>Fine Gael</i>	<i>Labour Party</i>	<i>Sinn Féin</i>	<i>Independents</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>(women)</i>
<i>Panels</i>							
Culture and Education	2	2	1	0	0	5	(1)
Agriculture	4	4	2	1	0	11	(1)
Labour	3	5	2	1	0	11	(3)
Industry and Commerce	3	4	1	1	0	9	(5)
Administration	2	3	2	0	0	7	(0)
<i>Universities</i>							
National University of Ireland	0	0	0	0	3	3	(0)
University of Dublin	0	0	1	0	2	3	(1)
Taoiseach's nominees	0	1	2	0	8	11	(7)
Total	14	19	11	3	13	60	(18)

Note: Party affiliations for university senators and Taoiseach's nominees are based on the party whip, if any, accepted by the senators in question following the initial meeting of the Seanad. Of the Taoiseach's nominees here placed in the 'Independent' category, two were prominently associated with Fine Gael and one with Labour.

Conclusion

As the discussion above has shown, the idea of the Seanad as a body that reflects party political divisions is much more strongly entrenched than the notion of the Seanad as a chamber that represents vocational interests. This has been the subject of agreement between observers from the beginning: the late doyen of Irish political science, Professor Basil Chubb, described the Seanad four decades ago as 'merely another selection of party politicians chosen in an unnecessarily complicated manner'.²² The 2011 election inevitably failed to do anything to dispel this perception.

One of the other recurring allegations about the Seanad has been that it is seen all too often as 'a place for grooming new Dáil candidates and as a political resting place for defeated deputies'.²³ This, too, was confirmed by the 2011 experience. As we have seen, in selecting Seanad candidates parties had an eye to providing a platform for potential candidates for the next Dáil election. Indeed, almost half (25) of the outgoing senators had contested the Dáil election. Some senators had used their position to particularly good effect. For example, one of the country's leading poll-toppers in the general election (Shane Ross, who, with 17,075 first preference votes, was second only to Fine Gael leader Enda Kenny in electoral popularity) earned his reputation not just

from his financial journalism but also from his robust performance as a senator. Nevertheless, it seems strange that, as it has been remarked, 'candidates receive votes to be elected to one house of parliament based on their potential to successfully challenge for election to another house of parliament'.²⁴ The other traditional role of the Seanad has been as a safety net for politicians defeated in Dáil elections. Here, too, the 2011 election was no exception: as mentioned above, no fewer than 47 of the candidates in the Seanad election had stood in the immediately preceding Dáil election, and 22 of these unsuccessful Dáil candidates were elected to the Seanad (a further two Labour candidates who had lost out in the Dáil and Seanad panel elections were appointed to the Seanad as part of the 'Taoiseach's eleven').

This role as an apparent antechamber to the Dáil has left critics of the Seanad with plenty of ammunition, even though many argue that its role as a forum in which talented Dáil deputies who happen to have lost their seats can continue to make a political contribution should not be dismissed out of hand. But this criticism reinforces principled objections to the existence of a second chamber in a small, unitary state. Nevertheless, no sustained, broadly supported case for the abolition of the Seanad has been made. The argument that this would save several million euros is no substitute for a careful cost-benefit analysis.²⁵ Implicitly blaming the Seanad for not helping to prevent the banking and public finance crises diverts attention from the responsibility of the government, the very body which for long has done little to enhance the role of the Seanad.

Abolishing the Seanad would entail a wide range of constitutional changes. The expression 'Seanad Éireann' occurs 65 times in the text of the constitution, and substantive references extend over 16 articles. These of course include articles 18 and 19 which describe the structure and role of the Seanad itself, and a further ten articles that deal with aspects of the legislative or other control functions shared with the Dáil. Abolishing the Seanad and allocating exclusive responsibility to the Dáil in these areas might pose few formal problems. But there are areas where implications for other institutions of state need to be considered. The Chairman of the Seanad is *ex officio* a member of the Council of State, and alternative arrangements would need to be made here. The Seanad also has a role to play in triggering a legislative referendum, but the fact that this has never happened suggests that dropping this provision from the constitution might attract little dissent. However, the Seanad Chairman is one of only three members of the Presidential Commission, which functions when the President is unavailable, and an alternative formula

for its composition would need to be devised. The right of the Taoiseach to appoint ministers from the Seanad (sparingly used, but potentially important at a time of crisis) would also disappear.

It seems strange, then, that no considered case for abolishing the Seanad has been made, nor have the implications of abolition been assessed in any degree of detail. The programme for government of the Fine Gael–Labour coalition prioritises abolition of the Seanad as one of three ‘urgent parliamentary reform issues’, and abolition is conditionally supported by the main opposition party, in the context of wider constitutional reform. This bold commitment implicitly ignores the painstaking deliberations (extending over the past 16 years) of earlier parliamentary evaluations of the composition and role of the second chamber, and prejudges the conclusions of the wide-ranging constitutional convention also promised in the programme for government. Hastily-reached cross-party consensus on this radical departure may ultimately be reinforced by convincing arguments, and may indeed lead to the disappearance of Ireland’s unusual second chamber. But it is too early to conclude that the whole set of practical and political difficulties, and issues of principle and procedure, will be overcome in time to allow this change to take place during the lifetime of the government. It would, therefore, be unwise to take it for granted that the 2011 election to Seanad Éireann will be the last.

Notes

1. I am grateful to Paul Sammon (Fianna Fáil), Terry Murphy (Fine Gael), Joe Costello, TD (Labour Party) and Brian Keane (Sinn Féin) for their assistance in the preparation of this article, and to Deirdre Lane (Clerk, Seanad Éireann), Attracta Halpin (Registrar, National University of Ireland) and Michael Marsh (Vice Provost, Trinity College, University of Dublin) for technical advice.
2. Harry McGee, ‘Government to consider referendum on abolition of Seanad’, *Irish Times*, 3 January 2011.
3. Computed from the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s Parline database, available at www.ipu.org, accessed 23 April 2011. This shows 29 second chambers as being based exclusively or mainly on direct election, 22 on indirect election and 18 on appointment, with a further eight based on a mixture of principles. For further discussion, see John Coakley and Michael Laver, ‘Options for Seanad Éireann’, pp. 32–107 in *Second Report of the All-Party Committee on the Constitution* (Dublin: Government Publications, 1996).
4. See the Council’s website at www.ds-rs.si/en/. The role of the National Council is defined in the constitution as largely consultative, but it is generally seen as a second chamber and is so classified by the Inter-Parliamentary Union.
5. For a general description of Seanad Éireann and its work, see the two standard texts: Thomas Garvin, *The Irish Senate* (Dublin: Institute of Public

- Administration, 1969), and John MacG. Smyth, *The Theory and Practice of the Irish Senate* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1972).
6. *Report: Committee on the Constitution and Powers of, and Methods of Election to, Seanad Éireann* (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1928) dealt with a new system to replace direct, popular election of senators. The *Report of the Second House of the Oireachtas Commission* (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1936) suggested that if a new senate were to be established it should comprise a mixture of appointed and indirectly elected members, but its minority report offered a more detailed blueprint close to the model written into the new constitution: it would comprise 50 members, ten nominated by the President of the Executive Council (the prime minister) and 40 elected from four panels (farming and fisheries, labour, industry and commerce, and education and the learned professions), with nominations made by relevant organisations and other interests, and election by Dáil deputies (pp. 26–34). The *Report of the Commission on Vocational Organisation* (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1943) concluded that the existing system of candidate nomination and election to the Seanad was ‘only partially’ determined by vocational principles, but was instead essentially party political (p. 310); it proposed the creation of a consultative, non-partisan ‘national vocational assembly’ alongside the existing Seanad. Finally, the *Report of the Committee on the Constitution* (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1967) endorsed retention of a second chamber ‘on vocational or functional lines’ but recommended little by way of reform to bring about this objective (pp. 29–31).
 7. The *Special Report of the Special Committee on the Seanad Electoral (Panel Members) Bill, 1937* (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1937), chaired by de Valera, failed to agree on any blueprint as an alternative to the scheme proposed in the original bill (p. v). The scheme provided for in the resulting act differed from the current scheme in important respects, including use of a single (in practice, extremely large) ballot paper for all candidates on all panels, and a smaller electorate with only seven representatives from each county or county borough. In combination, this produced a much lower electoral quota (of about eight votes). The *Report of the Joint Committee on Seanad Panel Elections 1947* (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1947) recommended a broader range of nominating bodies, separate election to each panel, expansion of the electorate to include all county councillors, and other reforms. The *Report of the Select Committee on the Seanad Electoral (Panel Members) Bill, 1952* (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1952) recommended inter alia reversing one of these reforms, by introducing a formula to restrict the number of candidates any nominating body could propose, thereby removing the need for a special nominating committee to filter candidates (pp. v–vii). The *Seanad Electoral Law Commission 1959: Report* (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1959) suggested a mechanism for ensuring that senators nominated by nominating bodies would also be elected by electoral colleges comprising members nominated by the nominating bodies themselves (pp. 16–20). The recommendations of the 1947 and 1952 reports were reflected in the Seanad Electoral (Panel Member) Acts, 1947 and 1954, but those of the 1959 report were not followed up.
 8. *Report of the Constitution Review Group* (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1996), pp. 65–71.

9. There was little overlap in the membership of the three committees. Only three members of the 1997 committee (chaired by Jim O’Keeffe) were on the 2002 committee (chaired by Brian Lenihan), and only one member of the latter committee served on the Seanad committee (chaired by Mary O’Rourke).
10. All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, *Second Progress Report: Seanad Éireann* (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1997), pp. 10–12.
11. All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, *Seventh Progress Report: Parliament* (Dublin: Stationery Office, 2002), pp. 38–9.
12. Seanad Éireann Committee on Procedure and Privileges: Sub-Committee on Seanad Reform, *Report on Seanad Reform* (Dublin: Stationery Office, 2004), pp. 9–13.
13. Minutes of the meetings of the group are available at www.environ.ie/en/Publications/LocalGovernment/Voting/. A further report appears to have been overlooked in the various listings of the 12 reports: *Representation of Emigrants in Seanad Éireann: A Consultation Paper Issued by the Minister for the Environment* (Dublin: Department of the Environment, 1996), which proposed that three of the Taoiseach’s nominees be replaced by three senators elected by the Irish diaspora.
14. Maurice Manning, ‘The Senate’, pp. 153–66 in Muiris MacCarthaigh and Maurice Manning (eds), *The Houses of the Oireachtas: Parliament in Ireland* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2011), p. 165.
15. The current version of the register was published in *Iris Oifigiúil* 23, 22 March 2011, pp. 400–1.
16. One difference between the two elections is that voting is exclusively carried out by mail. Furthermore, because of the small size of the panel electorate (which would exaggerate a certain random element that is sometimes present in surplus distributions), each ballot paper is treated as if it had the value 1,000, allowing for weighting of transferred papers through the use of the Gregory method when transferring surpluses. Extra rules have also been introduced to ensure that a balance is maintained between the two sub-panels in the case of each panel. These rules prevent the elimination of candidates from a sub-panel when this would result in that sub-panel failing to attain its minimum share of seats, and provide for the elimination of candidates of a sub-panel that has already won its maximum number of seats. It is thus possible for a candidate to be eliminated even though he or she has more votes than other continuing candidates on the same panel.
17. This refers to a group of 64 panel candidates who had also been candidates in the 2011 Dáil election, or who were outgoing senators. It should be noted that crude comparison of first preference votes fails to take account of two factors that have a major influence on this: the number of seats on a particular panel, and the number of candidates contesting these.
18. Computed from HEA statistical data for 2009, available at www.hea.ie/en/statistics, accessed 9 May 2011.
19. One other candidate, Francis Donnelly, an Independent, asked voters *not* to support him as he had belatedly switched his focus to the Labour panel, where he had also secured a nomination.
20. Each candidate was entitled to one free mailing. A collection of Seanad canvassing leaflets is reproduced at <http://irishelectionliterature.wordpress.com/index-of-electionsparty-literature/2011-seanad-index>.

21. The All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution had recommended in its *Second Progress Report* (1997, p. 12) that three of the Taoiseach's nominees be 'representative of the various traditions in the North'; its *Seventh Progress Report* (2002, p. 38) had recommended that four of these 'represent citizens resident in Northern Ireland'; and the Seanad Sub-Committee in its *Report on Seanad Reform* (2004, p. 49) had recommended that two of these 11 be from Northern Ireland, 'one from the unionist and one from the nationalist tradition'.
22. Basil Chubb, *The Government and Politics of Ireland* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 205.
23. Maurice Manning, 'The Senate election', pp. 165–73 in Howard R. Penniman (ed.), *Ireland at the Polls: The Dáil Elections of 1977* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), p. 167.
24. Theresa Reidy, 'The Seanad election', pp. 187–204 in Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh (eds), *How Ireland Voted 2007: The Full Story of Ireland's General Election* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 196.
25. The McCarthy Report estimated the annual cost of the Seanad at €25m and took the view that its abolition could make a saving at this level, but noted that 'any such proposition would require careful and extended consideration'; *Report of the Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes*, vol. 2 (Dublin: Stationery Office, 2010), pp. 149–50.